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Abstract
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference
domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always
be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching,
we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields
a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990)
result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets.
Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly
responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying'
blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
JEL classi¯cation: C62, C78, D70.
Keywords: Matching, Couples, Stability, Random Paths, Responsiveness.
1 Introduction
We consider entrance level labor markets that can be modeled as two-sided matching problems:
one side consisting of students, graduates, or workers, the other side consisting of residencies,
jobs, or ¯rms. Since in the last couple of decades the number of couples with the same profes-
sional interests has been growing, we focus on labor markets in which both members of couples
seek positions. A famous example of such an entrance level labor market with couples in the
US is the market where each year thousands of medical school graduates seek their ¯rst em-
ployment as residents or interns. Since the 1950's this labor market has been administered by
the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).1 One of the reasons for centralizing this
market, and later for reorganizing it,2 was that market outcomes did not seem to be `stable' as
indicated by unraveling (pre NRMP) or a signi¯cant reduction of voluntary participation in the
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1NRMP (pre reorganized NRMP). For simplicity, from now on we refer to one side of the market
as students and to the other side of the market as hospitals, even though we do not exclusively
restrict our attention to centralized markets such as the NRMP.
Loosely speaking, an outcome or matching is stable if there are no students/couples and
hospitals that are not matched with each other, but in fact would prefer to be. Thus, it is
easy to see that whenever contracts are not enforceable, stability is a minimal requirement
for the persistence of an outcome for any market (centralized or decentralized). Gale and
Shapley (1962), the `pioneers' of two-sided matching theory, provided an algorithm, the famous
deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm, that always ¯nds a stable matching in markets with only
single students. The algorithm ¯rst used by the NRMP in fact was a slight modi¯cation of the
deferred acceptance algorithm, which was independently developed. Hence, a stable matching
can be implemented for any centralized `singles market.' Moreover, Roth and Vande Vate (1990)
showed that a stable matching can also be reached by means of decentralized decision making.
They demonstrated that, starting from an arbitrary matching, the process of allowing randomly
chosen blocking coalitions to match will converge to a stable matching with probability one.
Thus, as long as we restrict attention to singles markets, in these markets { centralized or not
{ stability is possible. Unfortunately, once couples emerge on one side of the market, stability
is in danger: stable matchings may not exist (Roth, 1984) and it may be very di±cult (i.e.,
NP-hard) to decide if stable matchings exist for a given `couples market' (Ronn, 1990).
Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b) showed that for a special preference domain for couples, namely
the domain of `(weakly) responsive' preferences, stable matchings exist. A couple's preferences
are responsive if the unilateral improvement of one partner's job is considered bene¯cial for the
couple as well. If responsiveness only applies to acceptable positions, then preferences are weakly
responsive. Hence, (weakly) responsive preferences may re°ect situations where couples search
for jobs in the same metropolitan area (if one partner switches to a job he/she prefers and the
couple can still live together, then the couple is better o®). In fact, when couples have weakly
responsive preferences, one can derive associated individual preferences for all students that are
members of a couple. Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b) demonstrated that any stable matching of an
associated singles market is also stable in the couples market.
Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b) also showed that under a restricted unemployment aversion condi-
tion, the domain of weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the existence of stable match-
ings. In view of this result, the class of weakly responsive preferences is a natural starting point
for the study of decentralized decision making in couples markets. One may wonder whether
there is a path of `satisfying' blocking coalitions that leads to a stable matching. We answer this
question in the a±rmative. This implies in particular that starting from an arbitrary matching,
the process of allowing randomly chosen blocking coalitions to match will converge to a stable
matching with probability one. It also shows that to obtain a stable matching by decentralized
means there is no need to ¯rst determine associated individual preferences of the members of
the couples.
Obviously, weakly responsive preferences are quite restrictive because they a) almost take
us back to the model with only singles and b) do not capture important aspects such as a
couple's desire to live together (see also Remark 4.2). Thus, the next step in our analysis
is to try to extend our result to more general preferences. Since then stable matchings may
not always exist, particularly if couples preferences are based on distance considerations (e.g.,
Klaus and Klijn, 2005a, Example 3.8), we check for `conditional path convergence,' that is, we
only require the process of starting with an arbitrary matching and allowing randomly chosen
blocking pairs to match to converge to a stable matching with probability one if a stable matching
2exists. For one-sided matching problems, more precisely for roommate problems, Diamantoudi
et al. (2004) obtained such a conditional path convergence result.3 Unfortunately, in couples
markets conditional convergence cannot be obtained. It turns out that for couples markets with
non-responsive preferences, even in the presence of stable matchings, there may not exist a path
induced by satisfying blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, this `cycling'
is inherent in the underlying complementarities in the couples' preferences, and not so much a
problem related to our path construction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a couples market where the labor
market modeled consists of a supply side of hospitals and a demand side of couples composed
of medical students. In Section 3 we state and prove our result that, for weakly responsive
preferences and starting from an arbitrary matching, a stable matching can always be obtained
through at least one path of blocking coalitions, for instance, by using our deterministic path
algorithm for weakly responsive couples markets (DPC-algorithm). Furthermore, we remark on
some features of the DPC-algorithm and discuss di®erences between our and Roth and Vande
Vate's (1990) path construction. In Section 4 we provide a couples market with non-responsive
preferences and a unique stable matching. We show that there are initial matchings starting
from which the stable matching cannot be obtained by satisfying blocking coalitions.
2 Matching with Couples and Stability
For convenience and without loss of generality, we describe a couples market where the labor mar-
ket modeled consists of a supply side of hospitals and a demand side of couples composed of medi-
cal students; H = fh1;h2;:::;hmg and C = fc1;c2;:::;cng = f(s1;s2);(s3;s4);:::;(s2n¡1;s2n)g
are the sets of hospitals and couples. We denote the set of students by S = fs1;s2;:::;s2ng.
Each hospital has exactly one position to be ¯lled. Our results can easily be adapted to more
general situations that include single students (Remark 3.6) and hospitals with multiple posi-
tions.4 Furthermore, our results (as well as the results derived in Klaus and Klijn, 2005a,b) do
not depend on the students being speci¯cally paired in couples. All results would remain the
same if the setting would be extended to triples or any other constellation of ordered tuples of
students. Such an extension of the model could include mutual externalities between more than
two individuals, for instance between members of a family or among friends or colleagues.
Next, we describe preferences of hospitals and couples.
Hospitals' preferences: Each hospital h 2 H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation ºh over the set of students S and the prospect of having its position un¯lled, denoted
by ;. Let s 2 S. If s Âh ;, then student s is acceptable to hospital h; if ; Âh s, then student
s is unacceptable to hospital h. Hospital h's preferences can be represented by a strict ordering
of the elements in S [ f;g; for instance, P(h) = s4;s2;;;::: indicates that hospital h prefers
student s4 to s2, and considers the other students to be unacceptable. Let PH = fP(h)gh2H.
Couples' preferences: Each couple c 2 C has a strict, transitive, and complete preference
relation ºc over all possible combination of ordered pairs of (di®erent) hospitals and the prospect
of being unemployed. Couple c's preferences can be represented by a strict ordering of the
elements in H := [(H [ fug) £ (H [ fug)]nf(h;h) : h 2 Hg. To simplify notation, we denote a
generic element of H by (hp;hq), where hp and hq indicate a hospital or being unemployed. For
3See P¶ apai (2004) for a more general result on hedonic coalition formation.
4To be more precise, in order to straightforwardly derive all results for the case of hospitals with multiple
positions, we would require that hospitals' preferences are `responsive over sets of students' (see Roth, 1985).
3instance, P(c) = (h4;h2);(h3;h4);(h4;u); etc., indicates that couple c = (s1;s2) prefers s1 and
s2 being matched to h4 and h2, respectively, to being matched to h3 and h4, respectively, and
so on. Let PC = fP(c)gc2C.
Whenever we use the strict part Â of a preference relation, we assume that we compare di®erent
elements in S [ fug or H. Note that as for many classical matching markets with singles the
assumption that agents' preferences are strict is also crucial for matching markets with couples
(consider for instance Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Section 2.5).
Couples markets: A one-to-one matching market with couples, or a couples market for short,
is denoted by (PH;PC).
Matchings: A matching ¹ for a couples market (PH;PC) is an assignment of students and
hospitals such that each student is assigned to at most one hospital in H or to u (which can
be assigned to multiple students), each hospital in H is assigned to at most one student or to
; (which can be assigned to multiple hospitals), and a student is assigned to a hospital if and
only if the hospital is assigned to the student. If ¹(s) = u (¹(h) = ;), then student s (hospital
h) is called unmatched. If ¹(s) = h, or equivalently ¹(h) = s, then student s and hospital h are
called mates.
A matching ¹ is completely described by the list ¹(S) = (¹(s1);¹(s2);:::;¹(s2n)) of hospitals
or u assigned to students s1;s2;:::;s2n. Thus, sk is matched to ¹(sk).
Stability: Finally, we de¯ne stability for couples markets (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
First, if a hospital whose position is ¯lled can be better o® by unmatching, i.e., leaving its position
un¯lled, we would expect the hospital to act accordingly. Similarly, if one or both partners in a
couple can improve the given matching for the couple by unmatching, i.e., voluntarily choosing
unemployment, we would expect the couple to act accordingly. Formally, a hospital h 2 H is a
one-sided blocking coalition for matching ¹ if
(o1) ;Âh¹(h).
A couple c = (sk;sl) 2 C is a one-sided blocking coalition for matching ¹ if
(o2) (¹(sk);u)Âc(¹(sk);¹(sl)), (u;¹(sl))Âc(¹(sk);¹(sl)), or (u;u)Âc(¹(sk);¹(sl)).
We say that (c;(¹(sk);u)), (c;(u;¹(sl))), or (c;(u;u)) is a one-sided blocking coalition (depend-
ing on the condition in (o2) that is satis¯ed).
Second, if one partner in a couple can improve the given matching for the couple by switching to
another hospital such that this hospital is better o® as well, then we would expect this mutually
bene¯cial trade to be carried out, rendering the given matching unstable. A similar statement
holds if both students in the couple can improve. For a given matching ¹, [c = (sk;sl);(hp;hq)]
is a two-sided blocking coalition if (hp;hq) 62 f(¹(sk);u);(u;¹(sl));(u;u)g and
(t1) (hp;hq)Âc(¹(sk);¹(sl));
(t2) [hp 2 H implies skºhp ¹(hp)] and [hq 2 H implies slºhq ¹(hq)].
A matching is stable if there is no blocking coalition.
(In)stability in couples markets: Roth (1984, Theorem 10) showed that stable matchings
may not exist in the presence of couples. To make things worse, it can be very `hard' to decide if a
couples market has a stable matching: Ronn (1990) showed that determining if a couples market
has a stable matching is an NP complete problem. Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b) established the
existence of a stable matching when couples have so-called weakly responsive preferences. In the
4next section, we introduce this restricted preference domain and show that on this domain and
starting from an arbitrary matching, a stable matching can always be obtained through at least
one path of blocking coalitions. Clearly, one would be happy to establish similar results for other
preference domains, e.g., if preferences capture that couples do want to live together. However,
Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b, Theorem 3.5 and Corollary 3.6) essentially demonstrate that none of
these preference domains can even guarantee the existence of stable matchings. Furthermore,
in Section 4, we show that on the general domain of couples' preferences the existence of stable
matchings does not guarantee the existence of any `path to stability' through blocking coalitions.
3 Weak Responsiveness and Paths to Stability
First, we introduce the domain of weakly responsive preferences (see Klaus and Klijn, 2005a,b,
for more details). A couple's preferences are responsive if the unilateral improvement of one
partner's job is considered bene¯cial for the couple as well. If responsiveness only applies to
acceptable positions, then preferences are weakly responsive.
Weakly responsive preferences: Couple c = (sk;sl) has weakly responsive preferences if there
exist strict, transitive, and complete preference relations ºsk and ºsl over the set of hospitals
and the prospect of being unemployed u such that
(i) for all h 2 H,
(u;h) Âc (u;u) if and only if h Âsl u,
(h;u) Âc (u;u) if and only if h Âsk u,
(ii) for all hp;hq;hr 2 H [ fug,
[hpºsku, hqºslu, and hpÂskhr imply (hp;hq)Âc(hr;hq)] and
[hpºslu, hqºsku, and hpÂslhr imply (hq;hp)Âc(hq;hr)], and
(iii) for all h0;h00 2 H, h0 6= h00, uºskh0 and uºslh00 imply (u;u) Âc (h0;h00).
A couples market (PH;PC) is weakly responsive if all couples have weakly responsive preferences.
Remark 3.1 Weak responsiveness and associated individual preferences
Let (PH;PC) be a weakly responsive couples market. Then, for all c = (sk;sl), the associated
individual preferences ºsk and ºsl are only uniquely determined for acceptable positions. In
other words, if both [ºsk and ºsl] and [º0
sk and º0
sl] satisfy the three weak responsiveness
conditions, then for all hp;hq 2 H [fug, hpÂskhqºsku implies hpÂ0
skhqº0
sku, and hpÂslhqºslu
implies hpÂ0
slhqº0
slu.
Let (PH;PC) be a weakly responsive couples market. Then, from the couples' weakly re-
sponsive preferences we can determine associated individual preferences for all students that are
members of a couple. By (PH;PS(PC)) we denote an associated singles market5 obtained by
replacing couples and their preferences in (PH;PC) by individual students and their (possibly
not uniquely determined) associated individual preferences PS(PC). It is easy to see that all as-
sociated singles markets have the same set of stable matchings (see Remark 3.1). The following
existence theorem is due to Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b, Theorem 3.3).
5Note that this associated singles market is a standard two-sided matching market; for an excellent introduction
and overview see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
5Theorem 3.2 Stability for weakly responsive preferences (Klaus and Klijn, 2005a,b)
Let (PH;PC) be a weakly responsive couples market. Then, any matching that is stable for an
associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) is also stable for (PH;PC). In particular, there exists
a stable matching for (PH;PC).
However, not all stable matchings for (PH;PC) may be stable for (PH;PS(PC)). The
intuition is that some matching that would be unstable in a singles market is now stable because
a student may not want to block it by taking the position of his/her partner.
Finally, Klaus and Klijn (2005a,b, Theorem 3.5) showed that under a restricted unemploy-
ment aversion condition, the domain of weakly responsive preferences is maximal for the exis-
tence of stable matchings. In view of this result, the class of weakly responsive preferences is a
natural starting point for the study of decentralized decision making in couples markets.
Next, we show that for a weakly responsive couples market, starting from any matching,
there always exists a path of blocking coalitions that ends in a stable matching.
To describe this process of satisfying blocking coalitions, we use the following terminology.
Satisfying blocking coalitions: If a hospital h 2 H is a one-sided blocking coalition for a
matching ¹, then we say that a new matching º is obtained from ¹ by satisfying the blocking
coalition if h and ¹(h) are unmatched, and all other agents are matched to the same mates at
º as they were at ¹. Formally, matching º is obtained from matching ¹ by satisfying blocking
coalition h (for ¹) if
² º(h) = ; and º(¹(h)) = u;
² º(s) = ¹(s) for all s 2 Snf¹(h)g;
² º(¹ h) = ¹(¹ h) for all ¹ h 2 Hnfhg.
Similarly, if [(sk;sl);(hp;hq)] is a blocking coalition for a matching ¹, then we say that a
new matching º is obtained from ¹ by satisfying the blocking coalition if (sk;sl) and (hp;hq)
are matched to one another at º, their mates at ¹ (if any, and if not involved in the blocking
coalition) are unmatched at º, and all other agents are matched to the same mates at º as they
were at ¹. Formally, matching º is obtained from matching ¹ by satisfying blocking coalition
[(sk;sl);(hp;hq)] (for ¹) if
² [¹(sk) = h 2 Hnfhp;hqg implies º(h) = ;] and [¹(sl) = h 2 Hnfhp;hqg implies º(h) = ;];
² [¹(hp) = s 2 Snfsk;slg implies º(s) = u] and [¹(hq) = s 2 Snfsk;slg implies º(s) = u];
² º(sk) = hp, º(sl) = hq, [hp 2 H implies º(hp) = sk], and [hq 2 H implies º(hq) = sl];
² º(s) = ¹(s) for all s 2 Snf¹(hp);¹(hq);sk;slg;
² º(h) = ¹(h) for all h 2 Hnf¹(sk);¹(sl);hp;hqg.
We are now ready to state our main result.
Theorem 3.3 Paths to stability for weakly responsive preferences
Let (PH;PC) be a weakly responsive couples market. Let ¹ be an arbitrary matching for
(PH;PC). Then there exists a ¯nite sequence of matchings ¹1;:::;¹k such that ¹1 = ¹, ¹k
is stable, and for all i = 1;:::;k ¡ 1, there is a blocking coalition for ¹i such that ¹i+1 is
obtained from ¹i by satisfying this blocking coalition.
6Consider a random process that begins by selecting an arbitrary matching ¹ and then pro-
ceeds to generate a sequence of matchings ¹ = ¹1;¹2;::: where each ¹i+1 is obtained from ¹i
by satisfying a blocking coalition, chosen at random from the blocking coalitions for ¹i. Assume
that the probability that any particular blocking coalition for ¹i will be chosen to generate ¹i+1
is positive, and only depends on the matching ¹i (but not on the number i). Let R(¹) be the
random sequence generated in this way from an initial matching ¹.
Corollary 3.4 Random paths to stability for weakly responsive preferences
Let (PH;PC) be a weakly responsive couples market. For any initial matching ¹ for (PH;PC),
the random sequence R(¹) converges with probability one to a stable matching.
To prove Theorem 3.3, we construct an algorithm that, in a ¯nite number of steps, yields a
stable matching for any weakly responsive couples markets.
Before describing our `deterministic path algorithm' for weakly responsive couples markets,
we present how it would look like in singles markets. The advantage of this approach is that
a) the basic structure of the algorithm is easier to understand for singles markets and b) it is
easier to see which additional steps have to be taken to accommodate the presence of couples
in the market. In both algorithms that we present now, we will use a virtual room that agents
enter and exit throughout the algorithm. This didactic visualization aid was ¯rst introduced by
Ma (1996).
A Modi¯ed Deterministic Roth and Vande Vate Path Algorithm to Stability for Singles Markets
Let ¹ be an arbitrary matching for singles market (PH;PS). After satisfying one-sided blocking
coalitions for ¹ (¯rst stage) we start putting the students one by one in an initially empty room
(second stage). Each student enters with his/her mate under ¹, i.e., a student enters with a
matched hospital or alone. Whenever a student enters the room with his/her mate, blocking
coalitions within the room are satis¯ed and the hospitals that are `dumped' (i.e., unmatched
while blocking coalitions are satis¯ed) are put outside of the room. Thus, after this second stage
we obtain a matching where all students are matched to hospitals in the room, and for which
there are no blocking coalitions within the room. Finally, in the third stage, we let the hospitals
outside of the room enter one by one. In each step possibly a blocking coalition within the room
has to be satis¯ed before turning to the next step. A hospital that is dumped is put outside of
the room. The blocking coalitions that are satis¯ed in this stage are `hospital-optimal,' in the
sense that for the hospital involved there is no other blocking coalition available within the room
that would give it a better student. In each step the students are not worse o® and the number
of hospitals in the room does not decrease. Also, in each step there is a student that is strictly
better o® or the number of hospitals in the room increases strictly. Hence, after a ¯nite number
of steps all hospitals have joined the students in the room. Starting from ¹ we have obtained a
stable matching for singles market (PH;PS) through the satisfaction of blocking coalitions.
Note that in di®erence to Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) original algorithm, in our modi¯ed
version we use `dumping' of hospitals instead of choosing optimal blocking coalitions to avoid
cycles of blocking coalitions in the room in the second stage. Also, Roth and Vande Vate (1990)
do not di®erentiate between a stage in which the focus lies on the entering students (second
stage) and a stage in which the focus lies on the entering hospitals (third stage). For couples
markets both steps will play an important role. Henceforth we refer to the modi¯ed Roth and
Vande Vate algorithm presented above as MRV-algorithm.
A Deterministic Path Algorithm to Stability for Weakly Responsive Couples Markets
Let ¹ be an arbitrary matching for a weakly responsive couples market (PH;PC). After satisfy-
ing one-sided blocking coalitions for ¹ (¯rst stage) we start putting the couples one by one in an
7initially empty room (second stage). Each couple enters with their mates under ¹. Whenever a
couple enters the room with their mates, blocking coalitions within the room are satis¯ed and
the hospitals that are `dumped' are put outside of the room. Thus, after this second stage we
obtain a matching where all couples are matched to hospitals in the room, and for which there
are no blocking coalitions within the room. Finally, in the third stage, we let the hospitals out-
side of the room enter one by one. In each step possibly a blocking coalition within the room has
to be satis¯ed before turning to the next step. The blocking coalitions that are satis¯ed in this
stage are `hospital-optimal,' in the sense that for the hospital involved there is no other blocking
coalition available within the room that would give it a better student. We call the student that
is in all the hospital optimal blocking coalitions associated with the entering hospital the best
student.
There may be several blocking coalitions that match the entering hospital with the best
student. In order to assure the convergence of the algorithm we have to choose the blocking
coalition carefully. First, if matching the hospital with the best student while keeping the
partner's match constant is improving the matching for the couple, then we satisfy the associated
blocking coalition. However, it may be that the couple together with the hospital and the old
match of the best student's parter does not form a blocking coalition. In this case, we prove
(see the Claim in the third stage of the DPC-algorithm and its proof in the Appendix) that
the couple together with the hospital and the best student's previous match forms a blocking
coalition. We then match the hospital with its best student and the best student's partner with
the best student's previous match.
In each step the couples are not worse o® and the number of hospitals in the room does not
decrease. Also, in each step there is a couple that is strictly better o® or the number of hospitals
in the room increases strictly. Hence, after a ¯nite number of steps all hospitals have joined the
couples in the room. Starting from ¹ we have obtained a stable matching for couples market
(PH;PC).
Henceforth we refer to this deterministic path algorithm for weakly responsive couples mar-
kets as DPC-algorithm. Note that an additional complication in the DPC-algorithm compared
to the MRV-algorithm is the speci¯c choice of hospital optimal blocking coalitions in Stage 3.
We now formalize the DPC-algorithm.
Deterministic path algorithm to stability for weakly responsive couples markets
or DPC-algorithm
Input: A weakly responsive couples market (PH;PC) and a matching ¹ for (PH;PC).
Initialization: Set A := ;. We call A the room.
First Stage:
Satisfy all one-sided blocking coalitions (if any) and denote the matching obtained by ¹.
After Stage 1 we obtain a matching ¹1:=¹ without one-sided blocking coalitions.
Second Stage:
If there exists c0 = (s0
1;s0
2) 2 CnA, then put the couple and its mates in the room, i.e.,
² Set A := (A [ fc0;¹(s0
1);¹(s0
2)g)nfug.
8As long as there is a blocking coalition [c00 = (s00
1;s00
2);(h00
1;h00
2)] with fc00;h00
1;h00
2g µ A [ fug do:
Begin Loop: Satisfy [c00;(h00
1;h00
2)], and put hospitals that are dumped outside of the room:
² For i = 1;2, [if ¹(s00
i ) = h 2 Hnfh00
1;h00
2g then de¯ne ¹(h) := ; and set A := Anfhg];
² For i = 1;2 with h00
i 2 H, [if ¹(h00
i ) = s 2 Snfs00
1;s00
2g then ¹(s) := u];
² De¯ne ¹(c00) := (h00
1;h00
2) and for i = 1;2, [if h00
i 2 H then ¹(h00
i ) := s00
i ].
End Loop.
After Stage 2 we obtain a matching ¹2 := ¹ where all couples are in the room and
no blocking coalitions exist in the room.
Third Stage:
As long as there exists h0 2 HnA do:
Begin Loop: Set A := A [ fh0g.
If there is no blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g µ A [ fug, then GO BACK to
the beginning of the Third Stage.
If there are blocking coalitions [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g µ A[fug, then let s0
1 be h0's most
preferred mate among the ones it could get at these blocking coalitions. Let s0
2 be the partner
of s0
1. Without loss of generality, c0 = (s0
1;s0
2) 2 C.
Claim: [c0;(h0;¹(s0
2))] or [c0;(h0;¹(s0
1))] is a blocking coalition.
Case (a): If [c0;(h0;¹(s0
2))] is a blocking coalition, then satisfy it and if a hospital is dumped
(at most one!), then put it outside of the room:
² Let h¤ := ¹(s0
1). If h¤ 2 H, then de¯ne ¹(h¤) := ; and set A := Anfh¤g;
² De¯ne ¹(c0) := (h0;¹(s0
2)).
Case (b): Satisfy blocking coalition [c0;(h0;¹(s0
1))] (Claim) and if a hospital is dumped (at
most one!), then put it outside of the room:
² Let h¤ := ¹(s0
2). If h¤ 2 H, then de¯ne ¹(h¤) := ; and set A := Anfh¤g;
² De¯ne ¹(c0) := (h0;¹(s0
1)).
End Loop.
After Stage 3 we obtain a matching ¹3 := ¹ where all couples and all hospitals
are in the room and no blocking coalitions exist in the room.
Output: A stable matching ¹ for (PH;PC).
Note that throughout the DPC-algorithm every new matching is obtained by satisfying a
blocking coalition. The proof that the DPC-algorithm is well-de¯ned and produces a stable
matching for any weakly responsive couples market in a ¯nite number of steps is given in the
Appendix. In the following example we visualize the DPC-algorithm, showing the process of
satisfying blocking coalitions.
9Example 3.5 An application of the DPC-algorithm
Let (PH;PC) be the couples market given by Table 1. The sets of hospitals and couples are
given by H = fh1;:::;h9g and C = f(s1;s2);(s3;s4);(s5;s6);(s7;s8)g, respectively. Agents
that are not depicted are unacceptable. For instance, h1's preference list is given by P(h1) =
s4;s1;u;:::. It is easy to check that all couples' preferences are weakly responsive: associated
individual preferences are P(s1) = h3;h1;h6;u;:::, P(s2) = h2;u;:::, P(s3) = h2;h8;h6;u;:::,
P(s4) = h4;h2;h3;h1;u;:::, P(s5) = h3;h5;u;:::, P(s6) = h6;h3;u;:::, P(s7) = h3;h7;u;:::,
and P(s8) = h8;h4;h3;u;:::. In Table 2 we apply the algorithm to the initial matching ¹(S) =
(h1;h2;h7;h8;h5;h6;h3;h9). On the left hand side we give short explanatory comments that
guide through the algorithm (we abbreviate the term `blocking coalition' by `b.c.'). On the right
hand side we depict the matching at each point of the algorithm (whenever a hospital stands
below a student it is matched to this student). The vertical bar represents the door of the room:
the agents on the left are inside the room and the agents on the right are outside the room. We
obtain a path of matchings, each of them being the result of satisfying a blocking coalition for
the previous matching. The output is the stable matching ^ ¹(S) = (h1;u;h2;h4;h5;h6;h3;h8).
It is tedious, but not di±cult, to check that ^ ¹ is the unique stable matching for (PH;PC). ¦
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 s1s2 s3s4 s5s6 s7s8
s4 s4 s7 s4 s2 s3 s7 s3 s8 h3h2 h2h4 h3h6 h3h8
s1 s3 s8 s5 s6 s3 s8 h1h2 h8h4 h5h6 h3h4
s2 s5 s4 h6h2 h2h3 h5h3 h7h8
s4 h3u h6h4 h3u h7h4
s1 h1u h8h2 h5u h7h3
uh2 h6h2 uh6 h3u
h6u h2h1 uh3 h7u
h8h3 uh8
h6h3 uh4
h8h1 uh3
h6h1
h2u
uh4
h8u
h6u
uh2
uh3
uh1
Table 1: A weakly responsive couples market (PH;PC)
10Initial matching
s1 s2
h1 h2
s3 s4
h7 h8
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 h9
h4
Stage 1
eliminate one-sided blocking coalitions
s1 s2
h1 h2
s3 s4
u u
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
choose couple (s1;s2) to enter room
the room is stable
s1 s2
h1 h2
s3 s4
u u
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
choose couple (s3;s4) to enter room
the room is instable
s1 s2
h1 h2
s3 s4
u u
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
satisfy b.c. [(s3;s4);(h2;h1)]
the room becomes stable
s1 s2
u u
s3 s4
h2 h1
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
choose couple (s5;s6) to enter room
the room is instable
s1 s2
u u
s3 s4
h2 h1
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
satisfy b.c. [(s3;s4);(h6;h2)]
the room becomes stable
s1 s2
u u
s3 s4
h6 h2
s5 s6
h5 u
s7 s8
h3 u
h1;h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 2
let couple (s7;s8) enter room
the room is stable
s1 s2
u u
s3 s4
h6 h2
s5 s6
h5 u
s7 s8
h3 u
h1;h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h1 and h¤ = u
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h6 h2
s5 s6
h5 u
s7 s8
h3 u
h4;h7;h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h4 and h¤ = h2
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h6 h4
s5 s6
h5 u
s7 s8
h3 u
h2;h7;h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h2 and h¤ = h6
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 u
s7 s8
h3 u
h6;h7;h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h6 and h¤ = u
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 u
h7;h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (b): h0 = h7 and h¤ = u
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h7 h3
h8;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h8 and h¤ = h3
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h7 h8
h3;h9
Stage 3
Case (a): h0 = h3 and h¤ = h7
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 h8
h7;h9
Stage 3
h0 = h7
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 h8
h7 h9
Stage 3 and Output
h0 = h9
s1 s2
h1 u
s3 s4
h2 h4
s5 s6
h5 h6
s7 s8
h3 h8
h7 h9
Table 2: The DPC-algorithm applied to (PH;PC)
11Remark 3.6 The DPC-algorithm and single students
One easily accommodates single students in the DPC-algorithm by letting each single student
have a `¯ctitious partner' that ¯nds all hospitals unacceptable. For example, if single student
s has (strict) preferences given by P(s) = h1;h2;u;h3;:::, then replace s by couple c = (s;s0)
(where s0 is a ¯ctitious partner) with (strict) preferences P(c) = (h1;u);(h2;u);(u;u);(h3;u);:::.
Since the ¯ctitious couples have weakly responsive preferences, one can directly apply the DPC-
algorithm to obtain a matching that is stable in the original matching market.
Remark 3.7 Which matchings can be reached by the DPC-algorithm?
Clearly, if starting from any matching is allowed, all stable matchings can be reached (just start
with a stable matching). In particular, the DPC-algorithm can converge to stable matchings
that are not stable in the associated singles markets. If in the second stage we allow couples to
enter the room with a chosen blocking coalition, then even starting from the empty matching
where all students are unemployed and all hospitals' positions are un¯lled we can reach any
stable matching for the weakly responsive couples market in question (let all couples c choose
their match ¹(c) in a given stable matching ¹ will trivially induce that stable matching).
Remark 3.8 The DPC-algorithm and Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) algorithm
Note that our deterministic path algorithm for couples markets (the DPC-algorithm) is not a
straightforward adaptation of the Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) deterministic path algorithm
for singles markets (the RV-algorithm, for short). The second stage of the DPC-algorithm where
hospitals that are dumped in the process of satisfying blocking coalitions are put outside the room
until the third stage has no corresponding part in the RV-algorithm. Furthermore, even though
the loop construction in the third stage uses the same idea of `optimally' satisfying blocking
coalitions as in the RV-algorithm, our construction is more complex in order to accommodate
special `blocking structures' for couples.
The main problem with any attempt to apply the RV-algorithm directly to weakly respon-
sive couples markets is that blocking coalitions for the associated singles market may in fact
not induce permitted blocking coalitions in the couples market and that vice versa a blocking
coalition for the couples market may not induce a permitted blocking coalition in the asso-
ciated singles market. We illustrate this by means of a simple example. Let (PH;PC) be a
couples market with H = fh1;h2g, C = fc = (s1;s2)g, P(h1) = s1;s2;;, P(h2) = s2;s1;;,
and P(c) = (h1;h2);(h2;h1);(h1;u);(u;h2);(u;h1);(h2;u);(u;u). Clearly ¹¤(S) = (h1;h2) is
the only stable matching. In the associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)), couple c and PC is
replaced by `single' students s1 and s2 with P(s1) = h1;h2;u and P(s2) = h2;h1;u. If we apply
the RV-algorithm to matching ¹(S) = (h2;h1), it will converge to ¹¤(S), but only by satisfy-
ing blocking coalitions that do not induce permitted blocking coalitions in the couples market:
Starting from ¹(S) as a matching for (PH;PS(PC)), the only blocking coalitions are [s1;h1] and
[s2;h2]. However, satisfying blocking coalition [s1;h1] ([s2;h2]) implies matching ~ ¹(S) = (h1;u)
[~ ¹(S) = (u;h2)], which is worse for couple c than the initial matching ¹(S). On the other hand,
starting from ¹(S) as a matching for (PH;PC), blocking coalition [(s1;s2);(h1;h2)] would induce
satisfying two blocking coalitions in the associated singles market (PH;PS(PC)) simultaneously,
which is not permitted in the RV-algorithm.
If our aim was to extend the RV-algorithm to couples markets as straightforwardly as pos-
sible, then we could merge our second and third stage by immediately satisfying blocking coali-
tions of hospitals that are dumped in the second stage, using the loop construction of the third
stage. However, by separating the second and third stage, the proof that the DPC-algorithm is
well-de¯ned and converges in a ¯nite number of steps to a stable matching is more transparent.
12Remark 3.9 Exchanging the roles of couples and hospitals in the DPC-algorithm
If we reverse the roles of couples and hospitals in the algorithm, the proof of convergence becomes
somewhat more complicated. The changes of the ¯rst and second stage (and the proof that they
are well-de¯ned) are minor. However, recall that in the third stage all couples are and remain
in the room and hospitals enter one by one. Each time a hospital enters the room, some other
hospital may be sent out. Thus, we may have to satisfy a chain of blocking coalitions (see loop
of the third stage). Now consider the third stage after the roles of couples and hospitals are
exchanged. After one couple enters, its blocking may unmatch two students from two di®erent
couples. So instead of one chain of blocking coalitions, we have to satisfy two chains of blocking
coalitions, which is still possible, but it requires extra notation and `logistics.'
Starting from the empty matching and depending on whether all students or all hospitals
enter the room ¯rst, the RV-algorithm only converges to the hospital-optimal or the student-
optimal stable matching. Exchanging the roles of couples and hospitals would also change the
set of stable matchings that could be reached by the DPC-algorithm when starting from the
empty matching. However, for a couples market there may be no optimal matching for either
side of the market (Klaus and Klijn, 2005a, Theorem 4.2.)
4 Cycles of Blocking Coalitions
When couples' preferences are not weakly responsive there may be no stable matching. Obvi-
ously, in this case the DPC-algorithm cannot work. However, if a stable matching does exist
for a general couples market, then one may wonder whether the DPC-algorithm still converges
to a stable matching. More generally, one can ask if, for general couples markets with stable
matchings, there exists an algorithm that starts from any matching and converges to a sta-
ble matching. Before giving the answer to this question, we brie°y discuss the answer to the
corresponding question for roommate problems.
An important similarity between roommate problems and couples markets is that stable
matchings need not exist. In a recent paper, Diamantoudi et al. (2004) showed that for roommate
problems with stable matchings one can indeed construct an algorithm that will, starting from
any matching, converge to a stable matching. Since an existing stable matching is explicitly used
in the algorithm constructed by Diamantoudi et al. (2004), the algorithm is non-constructive
and therefore di®ers considerably from Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) algorithm and the DPC-
algorithm for two-sided matching markets.
In contrast to roommate problems, for couples markets it turns out that there may not exist
a path induced by satisfying blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. In other words,
for some couples markets that have stable matchings, there are initial matchings from which no
sequence of blocking coalitions leads to a stable matching. Thus, this `cycling' is inherent in the
underlying complementarities in the couples' preferences, and not so much a problem related to
the DPC-algorithm presented in the previous section.
13Example 4.1 Non convergence6
Let (PH;PC) be the couples market with H = fh1;h2;h3g, C = f(s1;s2);(s3;s4)g, and pref-
erences given by Table 3. (Again, agents that are not depicted are unacceptable.) It is easy
to check that ¹¤(S) = (h2;h3;u;u) is the unique stable matching. In Figure 1 we have de-
picted all possible paths obtained from satisfying blocking coalitions if we start with matching
¹1(S) = (h1;h2;u;u). Clearly, the path is unique and turns out to be a cycle. Moreover, the
cycle does not contain ¹¤. Hence, R(¹) as de¯ned in Section 3 `cycles,' i.e., does not converge
to a stable matching. ¦
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 s1s2 s3s4
s2 s2 s2 h3h1 h2h3
s1 s3 s4 h2h3
s1 s1 h1h2
Table 3: A couples market (PH;PC)
s s 3 4
s s    s s 1 2 3 4
h h     u u 1 2
m = 1
s s    s s 1 2 3 4
h h     u u 3 1
m = 2
s s    s s 1 2 3 4
u h     h h 1 2 3
m = 3
s s    s s 1 2 3 4
u u    h h 2 3
m = 4
s s    s s 1 2 3 4
h h 1 2 uh3
m = 5
s s 3 4
s s 3 4
s s 1 2
s s 1 2
s s 1 2
Figure 1: Cycle of blocking coalitions in Example 4.1
Remark 4.2 The role of weak responsiveness
As mentioned before, the assumption that couples' preferences are weakly responsive is quite re-
strictive. More realistic domains for couples' preferences would of course include non-responsive
preferences that also account for distance considerations between jobs and geographic prefer-
ences. We would love to establish more positive results for these domains. However, one con-
clusion from our analysis is that these results unfortunately cannot be obtained (Example 4.1).
Thus, we do not intend to proclaim that weakly responsive preferences are realistic, but that
they form the benchmark between `positive' and `negative' results in couples markets. We think
that even though the results are not as `nice' as one would wish for, it is still important to
describe what happens and where the dividing line between `positive' and `negative' results lies.
6We thank one of the referees for providing us with this example which is simpler than the example of a
previous version of the paper.
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The DPC-Algorithm is Well-De¯ned
We prove Theorem 3.3 by showing that the DPC-algorithm is well-de¯ned for weakly responsive
couples markets, i.e., we prove that given any weakly responsive couples market (PH;PC) and
any matching ¹ for (PH;PC), the DPC-algorithm produces a stable matching for (PH;PC) in
a ¯nite number of steps.
Proof. We consider the three stages of the DPC-algorithm. The ¯rst stage clearly is well-
de¯ned and terminates in a ¯nite number of steps. Also, the matching ¹1 at the end of the ¯rst
stage does not have one-sided blocking coalitions.
The second stage also is well-de¯ned and terminates in a ¯nite number of steps: there are
only a ¯nite number of couples and hence we only go through the loop a ¯nite number of times.
Moreover, the algorithm does not cycle in the loop since hospitals that are dumped are put
outside of the room. For the matching ¹2 at the end of the second stage it holds that
² there are no one-sided blocking coalitions because (i) matching ¹1 does not have one-sided
blocking coalitions and (ii) in the second stage all blocking coalitions that may be created
in the room are removed by the loop.
² C µ A since the second stage terminates when all couples are in the room.
² for each s 2 S, ¹2(s) 2 A[fug, because (i) when a student is put in the room, the hospital
he/she is matched to at that moment is put in the room as well and (ii) in the loop the
hospitals that are not dumped remain in the room.
² there is no blocking coalition [c00;(h00
1;h00
2)] with fh00
1;h00
2g µ A [ fug since in the loop these
blocking coalitions are satis¯ed.
We now proceed to prove that the third stage is well-de¯ned, terminates in a ¯nite number of
steps, and that the output of the algorithm ¹3 is a stable matching. We ¯rst prove that the
third stage terminates in a ¯nite number of steps. Note that all couples are in the room and
that during the third stage no couple leaves the room. Consider a loop of the third stage. Let
h0 be the hospital that enters. We distinguish between the following two cases.
² If there is no blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g then the matching does not
change. So, no couple is worse o®. The number of hospitals in the room has increased
strictly.
² If there is a blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g then from the speci¯c choice
we make it follows that at the new matching one couple is strictly better o® and no
other couples changes mates. At the same time at most one other hospital h¤ (which
was previously matched to one of the students in c0) may be sent out. So, the number of
hospitals in the room does not decrease.
Conclusion: each time we go through the loop we have that [no couple is worse o® and the
number of hospitals in the room increases strictly] or [no couple is worse o®, one couple is
strictly better o®, and the number of hospitals in the room does not decrease]. Since there are
only a ¯nite number of couples and hospitals it follows that the third stage terminates in a ¯nite
number of steps.
15It remains to show that the third stage is indeed well-de¯ned and that the ¯nal matching
is stable. To this end it is su±cient to show that the matching at the beginning of each loop
satis¯es the following properties.7
(i) There is no one-sided blocking coalition;
(ii) There is no blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with fh0
1;h0
2g µ (A [ fug)nfh0g;
(iii) The Claim holds (which is conditional upon the existence of a blocking coalition
[c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g µ A [ fug).
Induction Basis: We prove that conditions (i)-(iii) hold when the algorithm enters the loop
of the third stage for the ¯rst time.
(i) and (ii): It follows from the properties of ¹2 that (i) and (ii) hold when the algorithm enters
the loop of the third stage for the ¯rst time.
(iii): We prove that (iii) holds when the algorithm enters the loop for the ¯rst time. Assume
that hospital h0 2 HnA enters the ¯rst loop and that there is a blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)]
with h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g µ A [ fug. Let s0
1 be h0's most preferred mate among the ones he would get
at these blocking coalitions. Let s0
2 be the partner of s0
1. Without loss of generality we assume
that c0 = (s0
1;s0
2) 2 C. Given couple c0's weakly responsive preferences ºc0, let ºs0
1 and ºs0
2 be
associated individual preferences for students s0
1 and s0
2.
Suppose to the contrary that (iii) does not hold. Then [c0;(h0;¹(s0
1))] and [c0;(h0;¹(s0
2))]
are not blocking coalitions. Hence, there is a blocking coalition [c0;(h0;h0
3)] with h0
3 2
A [ fugnf¹(s0
1);¹(s0
2)g. Denote h¤
1 = ¹(s0
1) and h¤
2 = ¹(s0
2). Recall that by (i) (i.e., no
one-sided blocking), (h¤
1;h¤
2)ºc0(u;h¤
2), (h¤
1;h¤
2)ºc0(h¤
1;u), and (h¤
1;h¤
2)ºc0(u;u). Thus, by weak-
responsiveness, h¤
1ºs0
1u and h¤
2ºs0
2u.
If h0
3Âs0
2h¤
2, then [c0;(h¤
1;h0
3)] would be a blocking coalition in (A [ fug)nfh0g, contradicting
(i) or (ii). Since h0
3 6= h¤
2, h¤
2Âs0
2h0
3. If h0Âs0
1h¤
1 then [c0;(h0;h¤
2)] = [c0;(h0;¹(s0
2))] would be a
blocking coalition, contradicting our assumption that (iii) does not hold. Since h0 6= h¤
1, h¤
1Âs0
1h0.
If h0
3ºs0
2u then (h¤
1;h0
3)Âc0(h0;h0
3)Âc0(h¤
1;h¤
2). Thus, [c0;(h¤
1;h0
3)] would be a blocking coalition
in (A [ fug)nfh0g, contradicting (i) or (ii). If h0ºs0
1u then (h0;h¤
2)Âc0(h0;h0
3)Âc0(h¤
1;h¤
2). Thus,
[c0;(h0;h¤
2)] = [c0;(h0;¹(s0
2))] would be a blocking coalition, contradicting our assumption that
(iii) does not hold. Hence, uÂs0
1h0 and uÂs0
2h0
3. Then, (u;u)Âc0(h0;h0
3), contradicting [c0;(h0;h0
3)]
being a blocking coalition for (h¤
1;h¤
2)ºc0(u;u). This contradicts the assumption that (iii) is false.
Induction Assumption: Suppose that (i)-(iii) hold for loops 1 up to k of the third stage.
Induction Step: Now consider loop k + 1 (where k ¸ 1) of the third stage.
Since no agent is forced to accept an unacceptable agent in loop k, (i) is true. Using the
arguments for (iii) of the ¯rst loop it is easy to check that (iii) is again true for loop k + 1 if
(ii) is also true for loop k + 1. So it only remains to prove that (ii) holds for loop k + 1. It is
clear that (ii) holds for loop k + 1 if in loop k there is no blocking coalition [c0;(h0
1;h0
2)] with
h0 2 fh0
1;h0
2g µ A [ fug.
Let ¹k and ¹k+1 be the matchings at the beginning of loops k and k+1, respectively. Assume
that in loop k blocking coalition [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
2))] or [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
1))] with c0 = (s0
1;s0
2) is satis¯ed.
If a hospital h¤ is dumped in the process of satisfying the blocking coalition in loop k, then at
the beginning of loop k + 1 the room is de¯ned as Anfh¤g.
7In order to take care of the ¯nal outcome of the algorithm, one should also prove that the matching at the
end of each loop satis¯es the same properties. This has been taken care of by the induction argument we use.
16To prove (ii) for loop k + 1, we have to show that for ¹k+1 there is no blocking coalition
[¹ c;(^ h;~ h)] with f^ h;~ hg µ (Anfh¤g) [ fug. Suppose, by contradiction, there is such a blocking
coalition. Note that all agents remaining in the room [i.e., all agents in (Anfh¤g) [ fug] are
(weakly) better o® at ¹k+1 compared to ¹k. So, [¹ c;(^ h;~ h)] also blocks ¹k. Hence, if h0 62 f^ h;~ hg,
then we obtain a contradiction to induction assumption (i) or (ii) for loop k. So, without loss
of generality, f^ h;~ hg = fh0;~ hg.
If ¹ c 6= c0, then it follows immediately that in loop k hospital h0 did not choose its optimal
blocking mate; a contradiction. Similarly, if the blocking coalition in question equals [c0;(~ h;h0)],
then s0
2 Âh0 s0
1 and hospital h0 did not choose its optimal blocking mate; a contradiction.
Hence, the blocking coalition we consider is of the form [c0;(h0;~ h)].
Case (a): Let [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
2))] be the blocking coalition that is satis¯ed in loop k. Then, the
room at the beginning of loop k + 1 equals (Anf¹k(s0
1)g) [ fug.
Since [c0;(h0;~ h)] is a blocking coalition we have (h0;~ h)Âc0(h0;¹k(s0
2)). Weak responsiveness of
c0's preferences implies that ~ hÂs0
2¹k(s0
2). If ~ h = u, this contradicts induction assumption (i) for
loop k. If ~ h 2 H, then since the room at the beginning of loop k +1 equals (Anf¹k(s0
1)g)[fug,
~ h 6= ¹k(s0
1). Then by weak responsiveness of c0's preferences, (¹k(s0
1);~ h)Âc0(¹k(s0
1);¹k(s0
2)). So,
[c0;(¹k(s0
1);~ h)] is a blocking coalition for ¹k, contradicting induction assumption (ii) for loop k.
For Case (a) this ¯nishes the proof of (ii) for loop k + 1.
Case (b): Let [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
1))] be the blocking coalition that is satis¯ed in loop k. Then,
the room at the beginning of loop k + 1 equals (Anf¹k(s0
2)g) [ fug. Since we are in Case
(b), [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
2))] was not a blocking coalition. (In particular, ¹k(s0
2) 6= ¹k(s0
1).) Thus,
(¹k(s0
1);¹k(s0
2))Âc0(h0;¹k(s0
2)). Hence, by weak responsiveness of c0's preferences, ¹k(s0
1)Âs0
1h0.
In order for [c0;(h0;¹k(s0
1))] to be a blocking coalition, weak responsiveness of c0's preferences
requires that ¹k(s0
1)Âs0
2¹k(s0
2).
Since [c0;(h0;~ h)] is a blocking coalition we have (h0;~ h)Âc0(h0;¹k(s0
1)). Weak respon-
siveness of c0's preferences implies ~ hÂs0
2¹k(s0
1) and ~ h 6= ¹k(s0
1). Then transitivity and
¹k(s0
1)Âs0
2¹k(s0
2) imply ~ hÂs0
2¹k(s0
2) and ~ h 6= ¹k(s0
2). Then by weak responsiveness of c0's pref-
erences, (¹k(s0
1);~ h)Âc0(¹k(s0
1);¹k(s0
2)). So, [c0;(¹k(s0
1);~ h)] is a blocking coalition for ¹k, contra-
dicting induction assumption (ii) for loop k. For Case (b) this ¯nishes the proof of (ii) for loop
k + 1. 2
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